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THE EFFECTS OF FARM PRICE SUPPORT POLICIES  : 
HOW LEVEL IS THE PLAYING FIELD FOR GRAIN 
PRODUCERS IN NAMIBIA? 
 




In Namibia historically high levels of support to the commercial farm sector have been 
reduced in recent years in line with general market liberalisation trends. However 
some support remains. At the same time more attention has been paid to supporting 
the previously neglected communal sector. The avowed aim of politicians is to ensure 
that grain producers in Namibia operate “on a level playing field”. This paper 
examines to what extent the policy support playing field has been levelled for all major 
types of grain producer in Namibia. A methodology is introduced for developing a 
common measure of the effects of price support across grain producers with 
subsistence and commercial objectives and across scales of operation ranging from 1 
hectare to 300 hectares under grain crops. The finding show that the bulk of grain 
producers in Namibia, who farm most of the grain area, remain seriously 
disadvantaged compared to the fewer, larger farms. Ongoing discussions on 
outsourcing government support services to small farmers is likely to result in the 
playing field becoming more uneven and other compensating measures will need to be 





Government intervention in the agricultural sector since independence has 
aimed to equally support all types of farmers.  This move by government is an 
attempt to reverse the pre-independence support policies that were biased 
toward commercial farm interests. 
 
In the 1980s Namibian commercial farmers enjoyed the benefits of the South 
African policy environment that heavily favoured increased production by 
large scale, owner operated farms (Kirsten & Van Zyl, 1996). Subsidies and tax 
concessions for commercial farmers started to be reduced pre-independence, 
mostly as a result of South African budget cuts. Subsequently the process of 
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market liberalisation undid many of the protective effects of the South African 
marketing acts (Brand et al., 1992). 
 
Since independence the Namibian Government has introduced measures to 
support communal farming. Thus, while some commercial supports have 
been removed, communal support measures have been introduced. Where are 
we now? Has this resulted in an even playing field as far as public sector 
support to farmers is concerned? 
 
This paper attempts to address that question in respect of grain farmers in 
Namibia. Most analyses done on price support measures have focused on the 
commercial sector and have looked at interventions independently. 
Furthermore, comparisons of gainers and losers have normally been assessed 
in terms of producers verses consumers.  Yet, one substantive aspect in the 
Namibian context is that most subsistence farmers are not only producers but 
at the same time consume all or a large proportion of the grain they produce. 
 
This paper first develops a measure of policy effects, which enables 
comparisons to be made across commercial and communal farming situations 
and between small-scale farm-households and large-scale farms and schemes. 
This measure is applied to thirteen different farm types in Namibia to assess 
the evenness of the current price policy environment for grain producers. The 
implications of changes in policy for the evenness of the price policy playing 
field is also analysed and discussed. 
 
STANDARD POLICY EFFECT MEASURE FOR GRAIN PRODUCER 
TYPES IN NAMIBIA 
 
Grain production is undertaken on a wide variety of farms and in a variety of 
situations in Namibia. On private tenure land grain production takes place on 
irrigated and dryland systems. On customary land allocated on a permission 
to occupy basis, grain production also takes place under both irrigated and 
dryland conditions. All the foregoing systems are commercially oriented, 
produce for profit and consume virtually none of the grain they produce. 
 
Most of the land area under grain production takes place on communal tenure 
land by households producing largely for own consumption. In this category 
the most common size of production unit is 1-5 hectares, but some operators 
have up to 15 hectares under cultivation. 
 
The estimation of the effects of price support on these different types of farms 




the support policy in place. To make these comparisons across such a wide 
variety of farm types requires a standard measure to be used that compares 
policy effects on an equal footing. The standardised effect measure used in 
this study was developed in two stages. 
 
In the first stage, a measure of the net value of farm income/subsistence was 
devised that reflected both the production and consumption effects of price 
policy, since a significant number of farmers are producers and consumers of 
grain at one and the same time. The measure called net value of 
income/subsistence is defined as: 
 
Net value of income/subsistence  = The value of grain sales net of the costs of 
production and meeting farm-household 
grain consumption needs. 
 
Where no grain was sold and the farm is a deficit producer, the measure 
reverts to the cost of production of own consumed grain plus the cost of 
purchasing the deficit requirement. 
 
Where some grain is sold, but a large proportion is consumed, the measure 
reverts to the value of sales less the cost of producing all grains (sold and 
consumed). 
 
Where all the grain is sold and the quantity purchased for consumption is 
negligible in comparison, the measure reverts to the standard net income 
calculation for commercial operations (value of grain produced less costs of 
production). 
 
In the second stage, a scale neutralising calculation is made so that the 
absolute size of the price policy effect is proportional to the scale of the 
farming enterprise. The measure used is the absolute policy effect expressed 
as a percentage of the costs of grain production. 
 
Thus the standardised measure is defined as follows: 
 
% effect  =  Difference in net value of income/subsistence, with and without a 
price support policy, divided by the cost of grain production, 
expressed as a %. 
 
In this paper the above standardised measure is referred to as the % effect. 




PRICE SUPPORT POLICIES IN NAMIBIA: RECIPIENTS AND IMPACTS 
 
Grain producers in Namibia enjoy price support through measures that 
increase producer prices of commercial crops and subsidised inputs of 
various types. Not all producer types enjoy access to the same price support 
measures. One set of measures is mostly aimed at commercial producers, 
while the other set is aimed at helping communal farmers. 
 
Price support to commercial farmers 
 
These take the form of support to the maize grain price, and subsidies on 
water charges and interest rates. Commercial farmers pay for water and credit 
at rates below the opportunity cost of either. The Department of Water Affairs 
charges farmers at the Hardap irrigation scheme 1.5 cents per cubic metre. 
This compares with 15 cents per cubic metre to cover operating and capital 
costs (Namibia Resource Consultants) and an estimate of value added per 
cubic metre in commercial crop farming of 14 cents (Lange, 1997).  Following 
the World Bank’s recommendation (IBRD, 1997), 15 cents is taken as the 
opportunity cost for water for irrigated crop farming. Agribank charges 
commercial farmers 13% on seasonal loans against commercial rates of 20% or 
more. The impacts of these implicit subsidies are straightforward and direct. 
 
Commercial maize farmers receive higher prices for their produce at the farm 
gate than they would do if there were no import restrictions on maize grain. 
Mupotola & Westlake (1997) have estimated that the licensing system, which 
restricts maize grain imports until the local crop has been bought by the 
millers results in commercial maize producers receiving 10% higher prices 
than they would in the absence of the licensing system. 
 
The impact of this 10% increase on maize grain price to the millers goes 
beyond the commercial maize producers. It results in an increase in the price 
o f  m a i z e  m e a l  r e t a i l e d  i n  t h e  r u r a l  a r e a s  o f  N a m i b i a .  W e s t l a k e  ( 1 9 9 7 )  h a s  
made estimates of the maize meal price effect of the 10% maize grain support 
measure. These estimates assume perfect competition in the milling industry 
in Namibia, which is debatable. The Westlake estimates are used in this study, 
although they almost certainly underestimate the price effect of grain import 
licensing on retail maize meal prices. 
 
Additionally increases in maize meal prices impact on the retail price of millet 
grain, the alternative staple grains in the Northern Communal Areas. It is 




millet grain mirrors the price effect on retailed maize meal. In Caprivi millet 
grain is assumed to compete directly with maize grain. 
 
Price support to communal farmers 
 
These take the form of subsidies on inputs. Tractor hire, improved seed and 
fertiliser are supplied through the government extension services at below 
market prices. 
 
The tractor hire scheme is estimated to supply ploughing services to 2.2% of 
the farmers in the Northern Communal Areas (NEPRU, 1995). A similar 
scheme in Swaziland was found to supply just 3% of farmers (Biotechnology 
Consultants, 1990). Scheme users pay N$40/ha and the government 
subsidises the balance. Although aimed at smaller farmers, it is the larger 
ones that tend to gain access to the limited supply. In this analysis it is 
assumed that all farmers with more than 10 hectares will avail themselves of 
the scheme. In addition 15% of the middle sized group (6-10 hectares) will 
have access. 
 
For large farmers, the scheme is assumed to provide for half the area 
ploughed at a cost of N$40. This is a saving of N$100 per hectare, as private 
hire is costed at N$140/ha. For the middle sized group, who hire draft power 
for half their crop area, 15% will cost N$40 and the rest is costed at the private 
hire rate of N$140/ha. This gives a cost per hectare of N$125, or 89% of the 
cost of ploughing all the area at the unsubsidised private hire cost. 
 
Fertiliser is supplied under a Japanese aid programme is available to 
communal area farmers at N$20 per bag and to Namibia Development 
Corporation (NDC) schemes at N$30 per bag. The commercial price is N$80 
per bag. Although fertiliser is hardly used by communal dryland farmers, the 
large farmers under the Kavango Farmer Support Programme do use 
fertiliser. They are able to purchase up to 5 tons at the N$20 price and the 
remainder at the NDC scheme price of N$30. 
 
Improved millet seed is available to communal farmers at N$3/kg. A recent 
consultancy (Tripp & Balogun, 1997) estimated the cost of producing this seed 
at N$10.6/kg, which includes a margin for retailing. This is taken as the 
market, unsubsidised price. Commercial maize seed is  sold to NCA farmers 
at N$2/kg, compared to the commercial price of N$8.5/kg. 
 




EFFECTS OF PRICE SUPPORTS FOR DIFFERENT PRODUCER TYPES 
 
Farm models have been developed for each of the 13 different producer types. 
The net value of farm income/subsistence is calculated for each producer 
type, based on current prices. These values are then recalculated based on 
unsubsidised market prices of maize grain and the supported input types. The 
difference between the two values is expressed as the % effect of the support 
measure (relative to grain production costs in the base situation). 
 
Table 1 presents the % effects of the price support policies for different 
producer types. For small farmers in Kavango (k-s) and North Central (n-s), 
the effects of price support are negative to the extent of –3 to -5% of grain 
production costs. This is because these are deficit grain producers, who use 
little purchased inputs, but who face higher maze meal prices resulting from 
the maize grain licensing measure. The small farmers in Caprivi and the 
middle sized farmers in the North Central and Caprivi regions are also deficit 
producers, so they are negatively affected by the maize grain licensing 
measure. However they benefit positively from using improved seeds and/or 
subsidised tractor hire. Overall these farmers enjoy a positive effect from 
current price support policies ranging from 4-18%. 
 
Medium scale farmers in Kavango and large communal farmers benefit from 
the maize price support policies as well as the other subsidies available to 
communal farmers. Overall these farmers enjoy a positive effect from current 
price support policies ranging from 17-26%. 
 
Private dryland (17%) and irrigated commercial farmers (26%) also fall within 
this range of benefit, though most of this comes from maize price support and 
subsidised water. 
 
The greatest beneficiaries from the current price support policies are the 
parastatal NDC farms and the NDC supported large commercial farms 
operating in communal areas in the Kavango region. This is an interesting 
finding, which confirms that political influence is a major determinant of 
where policy benefits go. However, it is not confined to Namibia or even to 
Southern Africa. In the EU, for example,  80% of the agricultural support 
funds go to only 20% of the wealthiest farmers (Lowasz, 1998). 
 
 





Table 1:  Price policy effects as a percentage of farm production costs 
 
Household type  Farm 
production 
costs (N$) 
Gain of loss from current price support measures as % of farm production 








Fertiliser Water Credit  Total 
NCR 0-5hs (n-s)  679  -3%  0% 0%  0%  0%   0%  -3% 
NCR 5-10ha (n-m)  1053  -1%  5% 4%  0%  0%   0%  8% 
NCR 10+ha (n-l)  4854  1%  14% 2%  0%  0%   0%  17% 
Kavango 0-5ha (k-s)  467  -5%  0% 0%  0%  0%   0%  -5% 
Kavango 5-10ha (k-m)  840  1%  7% 12% 1%  0%    0%  21% 
Kavango 10+ha (k-l)  4578  1%  15% 4%  0%  0%   0%  20% 
Caprivi 0-5% (c-s)  437  -6%  0% 2%  8%  0%   0%  4% 
Caprivi 5-10ha (c-m)  1188  -1%  3% 4%  12%  0%   0%  18% 
Caprivi 10+ ha (c-l)  6324  2%  15% 2%  7%  0%   0%  26% 
FSP farmers (fsp)  51510  7%   4%  0%  53%    0%  64% 
NDC schemes (ndc)  914089  11%       22%  0%  0%  33% 
Private dryland (p-dr)  138935  13%          4 %   17% 
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THE IMPACT OF OUTSOURCING AND COMMERCIALISATION 
 
Both paragraphs 35 and 179 of Namibia National Agricultural Policy 
discussed agricultural services provided by the government. In paragraph 
179, it is stated that the “Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural 
Development will consider carefully which agricultural services can best be 
provided by the private sector, including farming communities, NGOs and 
Co-operatives. Since this statement was made in 1995, not much has taken 
place. However, recently, outsourcing of government services and 
commercialisation become a catchword. Accordingly, the Ministry is planning 
to commercialise the current subsidised tractor hire services. The effect of this 
on the “evenness of the playing field” is illustrated by comparison of Charts 1 
(a) and (b). 
 
When comparing charts (a) and (b) it comes out clearly that if the ploughing 
support services are withdrawn, the most affected groups are communal 
middle and large farmers. For example, the Caprivi large farmers (c-l), who 
enjoy benefits of 25% currently, would have these reduced to 11% if tractor 
subsidies are removed. 
 
While the private dryland farmers are not affected in absolute terms, they gain 
relatively from the removal of tractor subsidies, as they then enjoy benefits 
which are greater than all communal area farmers. 
 
The situation with small communal farmers also remains unchanged in 
absolute terms, since the vast majority of them do not gain access to tractor 
services. It should be noted here that the small communal farmers, who 
constitute 75% of all grain producers and cultivate 65% of all grain area, either 
loose or gain only small benefits from the current price policy support 
measures. 
 
IMPLICATION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Policy support measures introduced by government have brought the levels 
of support enjoyed by medium and large farmers in the Northern Communal 
areas to a similar scale of benefit as enjoyed by private commercial grain 
producers. This is a significant achievement. However two very important 
caveats need to be made: 
 
(a)  The push for commercialisation and outsourcing of agri-services is in 
danger of undermining the levelling achievements; 




(b)  For the vast majority of farmers, who cultivate the bulk of the grain 
area, current price policy support measures result in either negative or 
very small positive benefits. 
 
The reason for (b) above, of course, is that price policy is not appropriate for 
subsistence farmers who sell little of their production and use few purchased 
inputs. Other measures must therefore be considered. One such alternative is 
in the area of research and extension. Here again the playing field has been 
very uneven in the past. For example huge amount of resources have been 
employed by the Agricultural Research Council in South Africa and 
impressive returns have been measured and reported on by Thirtle et al. 
(1998) in this conference. These investments and returns have been directed 
entirely at the needs and circumstances of large commercial farmers. 
 
In Namibia the government has taken the bold step of adopting a Farming 
Systems Research and Extension strategy precisely to target the needs of 
resource poor farmers and to attempt to redress the previous bias towards 
large scale commercial farming in the use of public sector research and 
development funding. This is not a short term solution. It will take time to 
implement effectively and for dividends to be realised by resource poor 
farmers. 
 
If government and society are serious about “levelling the playing field for 
all”, it is important to do three things. First to keep monitoring the situation 
and measuring relative benefits across all players so that politicians can 
compare what they like to think they have achieved, with what the actual 
situation is like for all types of producers. Second it will be necessary to be 
clear how fashionable trends, such as outsourcing of agri-services, are likely to 
impact on the wider objectives of equity. Third it will be necessary to go 
beyond price policy measures and employ complementary strategies, such as 
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